The agreement signed by Donald Trump and Anthony Albanese promises to reshape the map of critical minerals — the invisible foundation of industrial power in the twenty-first century.
With more than US$8.5 billion in joint investments and commitments to accelerate projects in Australia, the official narrative is clear: “break free from dependence on China.” Yet beneath the surface of political and market enthusiasm lies an uncomfortable question: can the West truly emancipate itself from the industrial architecture China has been consolidating for over three decades?.
The pact has an undeniable merit: it coordinates public investment and industrial policy among allies — something neither the Biden administration nor its predecessors managed to achieve at this scale. The designation of concrete projects — Arafura, Alcoa–Sojitz, Sunrise, among others — shows that Washington has moved from rhetoric to action.
However, timing is the Achilles’ heel. Building an integrated rare earths value chain takes eight to ten years and billions in capital-intensive investment. Meanwhile, China controls over 70% of global production and 90% of refining capacity.
The challenge is not only geological but also industrial. Even the new Australian mines will continue to depend on Chinese technology, inputs, and know-how for separation and refining stages. In other words, the West may have the rocks, but China dominates the chemistry.
The quest for “mining sovereignty” thus becomes a paradox: to compete with China, one must rely on the very laboratories, furnaces, and metallurgical processes developed under its industrial umbrella.
Trump presents this pact as part of his policy of “energy and mineral dominance,” framed within the America First narrative. Yet the alliance with Australia is more tactical than structural, primarily aimed at securing military supplies (AUKUS and naval defense).
Australia, for its part, gains capital but faces the challenge of avoiding a purely extractive role — remaining a supplier of raw materials without capturing local value- added.
Mastering the entire mineral supply chain does not guarantee geoeconomic success, but without mastering it, it is impossible to compete on the front lines of the twenty- first century.
On that board, China is already playing in the major leagues, while the West — even with grand announcements — continues to react rather than anticipate.
While the Trump–Albanese agreement accelerates projects in Australia, Beijing is advancing in Africa and Latin America, securing long-term contracts for lithium, cobalt, and graphite. It will be worth watching the next moves of both the United States and China in Latin America — especially in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, all rich in mineral resources.
These nations have traditionally fallen under U.S. political influence, yet China has made significant inroads economically.
The U.S.–Australia pact is not a revolution, but it is a serious attempt to regain industrial control. Its success will depend on whether it can create a shared value network among industrial democracies — spanning from mining to processing — or whether it will end up as another mirage of self-sufficiency in a market that, in reality, is already defined by global interdependence.
History teaches us that natural resources do not guarantee power. Strategic intelligence to transform them into industry does.
Source: Plusmining